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Note 
An Emerging Trend in International Trade:  
A Shift to Safeguard Against ISDS Abuses and 
Protect Host-State Sovereignty 
Nikesh Patel 
I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS “ISDS”? 
Investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) is a legal 
mechanism contained in many international trade treaties that 
grants an investor the right to use dispute settlement 
proceedings to sue host governments in an international 
tribunal.1 ISDS thus functions as an instrument of public 
international law providing investors protection under a given 
international trade treaty. With respect to ISDS, often the 
difficulty in structuring an international trade treaty is finding 
the right balance between providing investor protection and 
protecting state sovereignty from abuses. As investors have 
increasingly continued to initiate ISDS cases and sue host 
governments under respective investment trade treaties,2 
 
  J.D. Candidate, 2017, University of Minnesota Law School. The author 
acknowledges Professor Oren Gross for his guidance and the Minnesota Journal 
of International Law editors and staff for their assistance in the publication 
process. 
1. See Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs & Jeffrey Sachs, Columbia Ctr. on 
Sustainable Inv., Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Public Interest and U.S. 
Domestic Law 1 (2015), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/05/Investor-State-
Dispute-Settlement-Public-Interest-and-U.S.-Domestic-Law-FINAL-May-19-
8.pdf. 
 2. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT: REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN 2014 1 (2015), http://unctad.org/
en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2015d2_en.pdf (“Investors continue to use 
the investor–State dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism. In 2014, claimants 
initiated 42 known treaty-based ISDS cases. The total number of known ISDS 
cases reached 608.”). 
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“investment dispute settlement is at the heart of this debate, 
with a number of countries reassessing their positions.”3 
Recently, Cecilia Malmström, the European Commissioner 
for Trade, addressed the issue in question and stated Europe’s 
renewed vision of international trade policy for the 21st century: 
My assessment of the traditional ISDS system has been 
clear—it is not fit for purpose in the 21st century . . . I 
want to ensure fair treatment for EU investors abroad, 
but not at the expense of governments’ right to regulate. 
Our new approach ensures that a state can never be 
forced to change legislation, only to pay fair 
compensation in cases where the investor is deemed to 
have been treated unfairly.4  
Malmström’s recent statement concerning ISDS reform 
reflects an emerging international consensus to improve the 
regime of international investment agreements (“IIA”s) and the 
ISDS mechanism as a better framework for sustainable 
development.5 As countries increasingly continue to integrate 
more with the global economy through international investment 
agreements,6 the ISDS mechanism has been brought into the 
public eye, offering an opportunity for countries to rethink policy 
in trade agreements. Consequently, countries are shifting trade 
policy in the 21st century towards safeguarding against ISDS 
abuses and providing a more host-state friendly framework. 
This Note seeks to address an emerging trend in 
international investment policy towards safeguarding against 
ISDS abuses and protecting host-state sovereignty. Part II 
outlines the background of the ISDS mechanism in international 
trade treaties and presents major arguments arising from its 
application. Part III presents recent findings on ISDS disputes. 
 
 3. Id. at 23. 
 4. Cecilia Malmström, Investments in TTIP and Beyond - Towards an 
International Investment Court, EUROPEAN COMM’N (May 5, 2015), 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/malmstrom/blog/investments-ttip-
and-beyond-towards-international-investment-court_en. 
 5. See generally UNCTAD Releases Review of Trends in Investment 
Agreements and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, U.N. CONFERENCE ON 
TRADE & DEV. (Feb. 19, 2015), http://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx
?OriginalVersionID=929&Sitemap_x0020_Taxonomy=UNCTAD+Home 
(describing global trends in favor of the use of IIAs in the context of ISDS cases). 
 6. See id. (“In 2014, countries concluded one international investment 
agreement every other week.”). 
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Part IV analyzes recent trends in international trade policy from 
various countries as a result of certain ISDS cases initiated by 
investors. Finally, this Note concludes increased international 
attention and ISDS disputes have resulted in an emerging shift 
in trade policy where host-state governments are shifting to 
safeguard against abuses and to protect government obligations. 
II. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF ISDS 
A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
International uniform law and ISDS share a common 
goal7—”to reduce the importance of national borders in cross-
border relationships by creating a fair, even, and predictable 
playing field for private parties, regardless of their nationalities 
and the loci of their activities.”8 More specifically, the Office of 
the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) suggests for 
governments to implement ISDS for at least three reasons: (1) to 
resolve investment conflicts without creating state-to-state 
conflict; (2) to protect citizens abroad; and (3) to signal to 
potential investors that the rule of law will be respected.9 
“Prior to the emergence of the ISDS system in the mid-20th 
century, investor-state disputes” were handled through 
diplomatic processes, “or, at times, by the threat or use of 
military force.”10 Numerous elements of the current investment 
protection system can be traced back to the Friendship, 
Navigation and Commerce Treaties of the 19th and 20th 
centuries.11 Countries like the United States, United Kingdom, 
and Japan signed the treaties in the post-World War II era.12 
 
 7. Joshua Karton, Lessons from International Uniform Law, in 
RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: JOURNEYS 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 48, 52 (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2015). 
 8. Id. 
 9. FACT SHEET: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Mar. 11, 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-
us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-state-dispute-
settlement-isds. 
 10. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 7 (2012), http://www.oecd.org
/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/50291642.pdf. 
 11. See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 22–23 (2009) [hereinafter 
NEWCOMBE]. 
 12. See John F. Coyle, The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation 
in the Modern Era, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 302, 310 (2013). 
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The treaties were primarily signed to promote trade and 
commercial relationships, however the investment protection 
function of these treaties came to dominate. The treaties were 
essentially designed to facilitate post-war reconstruction in 
Europe thereby resulting in significant investment 
protections.13 Before ISDS, an investor whose property was 
treated inappropriately by a foreign government sought a 
discriminatory action in the domestic courts of the foreign 
government or support “of their claim by their investor’s home 
government through a state-to-state dispute settlement.”14 With 
that in mind, ISDS intended to reflect a more cooperative and 
peaceful “mechanism for [effectively] addressing disputes 
between investors and host countries” without having to subject 
states to conflicts.15 
In 1959, elements and provisions of modern investment 
protection law were introduced, where “ISDS first appeared in a 
bilateral trade agreement between Germany and Pakistan.”16 
“The intention was to encourage foreign investment by 
protecting investors from discrimination or expropriation.”17 
Nevertheless, “it was not until the late 1980s and early 1990s 
that a specific type of dispute settlement was introduced in 
investment treaties,” including the North American Free Trade 
Agreement and the Energy Charter Treaty.18 Instead of a state-
to-state dispute, the dispute settlement proceedings now allow a 
foreign company as an investor to directly file suit “against the 
host state and seek arbitration between the investor and the 
state” government.19 Accordingly, the newly established system 
of investor-state dispute settlement shifted investment 
 
 13. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 11, at 23. 
 14. MARTIN A. WEISS, SHAYERAH ILIAS AKHTAR, BRANDON J. MURRILL & 
DANIEL T. SHEDD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44015, INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS (IIAS): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 13 (2015). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See The Arbitration Game, ECONOMIST (Oct. 11, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21623756-
governments-are-souring-treaties-protect-foreign-investors-arbitration. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See NIKOLAOS I. THEODORAKIS, TRANSPARENCY IN INVESTOR-STATE 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: LAW, PRACTICE, AND EMERGING TOOLS AGAINST 
INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION 23 (2015). 
 19. See MARKUS KRAJEWSKI, MODALITIES FOR INVESTMENT PROTECTION 
AND INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS) IN TTIP FROM A TRADE 
UNION PERSPECTIVE 6 (2014). 
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agreements from “mere tools of commercial diplomacy into 
legally enforceable instruments.”20 
An investor-state dispute settlement mechanism was an 
“institutional innovation inasmuch as it helped to reduce sources 
of international tension and recourse to military force.”21 The 
goal was to “promote compliance with international law, help to 
settle international disputes, and provide redress for victims of 
harm caused by violations of various aspects of international 
law.”22 ISDS thereby provides “both an enforcement mechanism 
that promotes compliance and a means of compensating victims 
of harm caused by breaches of investment treaty provisions.”23 
As a result of its continued application, “states give their consent 
to participate in ISDS [proceedings] in some 3,000 international 
investment treaties.”24 
B. ARGUMENTS ARISING FROM ISDS 
Numerous arguments surround the issue of ISDS as a 
mechanism incorporated in international investment treaties. 
Both supporters and opponents frame their arguments based 
upon disciplines and rationale arising from political science, 
economics, and the law. 
Proponents often argue that Foreign Direct Investment 
(“FDI”) encourages more foreign investment and such 
investments benefit an economy with more jobs and 
development, thereby increasing economic growth.25 An open 
international investment environment creates jobs and wealth 
worldwide and improves infrastructure in participating 
countries ranging from developed, developing and emerging 
economies.26 ISDS is “a fair, efficient investment protection 
system” that protects investors from non-discriminatory 
treatment by host-state countries.27 ISDS provides a “swift and 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
supra note 10, at 7. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 8. 
 24. Id. at 63. 
 25. See BUS. AND INDUS. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE OECD, INVESTOR-STATE 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF INVESTMENT 
PROTECTION 2 (2015), http://biac.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/BIAC-
Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement.pdf. 
 26. Id. at 2. 
 27. See id. at 1. 
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high-quality mechanism of legal dispute resolution in cases of 
breaches of investment treaties by host states.”28 Therefore, the 
resolution system creates a non-discriminatory legal framework 
that is instrumental for enterprise, investment, and growth. 
Furthermore, without ISDS, the enforceability of 
contractual obligations between investors and the government 
would be undermined.29 As a result of regulatory risk, investors 
are less incentivized to make “beneficial investments . . . to the 
socially optimal amount.”30 A holdup problem is therefore 
created where domestic regulations and policies can be 
arbitrarily imposed on investors thereby increasing the costs for 
investors and making investors less likely to further invest.31 In 
effect, some argue that ISDS mitigates the holdup problem by 
indemnifying investors if a host government’s policies “are 
causing ‘unjustified’ harm through an ex post erosion of 
investment incentives.”32 The mechanism provides further 
assurance against discriminatory treatment because it follows 
procedures separate from the government’s legal system. 
Aside from the economic rationale, some also argue that 
ISDS protects against political risk. As suggested by Terra 
Lawson-Remer, an economist at the Brookings Institution, ISDS 
clauses protect investors against egregious governmental abuse 
by purchasing political-risk insurance.33 Investors can seek 
remedies through a uniform, agreed-upon arbitration system 
that is non-discriminatory, timely, and outside the political 
control of the host-state government. ISDS arbitration can thus 
provide a framework for international law to mitigate potential 
political risk and protect against a host-state’s changing political 
climate.34 ISDS also upholds the rule of law pursuant to the 
investment treaty and shields investors from domestic courts, 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Peter H. Chase, TTIP, Investor–State Dispute Settlement and the 
Rule of Law, 14 EUR. VIEW 217, 221 (2015). 
 30. WILHELM KOHLER & FRANK STÄHLER, THE ECONOMICS OF INVESTOR 
PROTECTION: ISDS VERSUS NATIONAL TREATMENT 1 (2016), http://www.cesifo-
group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-
CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2016/wp-cesifo-2016-
02/cesifo1_wp5766.pdf. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Id. at 2. 
 33. See The Arbitration Game, supra note 16. 
 34. See Won-Mog Choi, The Present and Future of the Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement Paradigm, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 725, 725–47 (2007). 
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potential expropriation, and damaging public policies.35 As a 
result, supporters contend that the ISDS framework encourages 
FDI for economic growth and development and ensures investor 
protection from political risk. 
In contrast, opponents have arguments grounded upon 
public versus private rights and protection of national 
sovereignty against corporate interests. First, on the grounds of 
public versus private rights, it is argued that ISDS has 
“completely circumvent[ed] the very balance between private 
and public rights that has developed in the domestic context, and 
undermines the institutions that continue to shape it.”36 In other 
words, private arbitration courts are not the preferred 
institution to solve investor-state disputes. Rather, it is urged 
that domestic courts ought to be the appropriate institution 
because such courts prevent total insulation of host governments 
from regulating for the public interest and are more likely to 
consider the environmental, security, safety, and social interests 
than ISDS tribunals.37 Accordingly, Economist Joseph Stiglitz, 
Professor Judith Resnik, Professor Cruz Reynoso, and former 
Federal Judge Lee Sarokin shared these concerns in their letter 
to Congress opposing ISDS.38 The letter noted that ISDS risks 
undermining democratic norms because domestic laws and 
regulations enacted by elected officials are insulated from input 
in a private arbitration process.39 The authors further noted that 
domestic law follows precedent and is a “uniform application of 
the law regardless of which judge or court hears a case” whereas 
ISDS arbitration panel decisions cannot be appealed and are not 
required to follow precedent.40 
Furthermore, arguments against ISDS are also grounded 
upon the protection of national sovereignty over corporate 
 
 35. See id. 
 36. JOHNSON, SACHS & SACHS, supra note 1, at 5. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See generally Letter from Judith Resnik, Professor, Yale Law Sch., Cruz 
Reynoso, Professor, Univ. of Cal., Honorable H. Lee Sarokin, Former U.S. 
Circuit Judge, U.S. Court Appeals, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Professor, Colum. Univ., 
& Laurence H. Tribe, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Mitch McConnell, Senate 
Majority Leader, Harry Reid, Senate Minority Leader, John Boehner, Speaker 
of the House, & Nancy Pelosi, House Minority Leader (Apr. 30, 2015) (“ISDS 
weakens the rule of law by removing the procedural protections of the legal 
system and using a system of adjudication with limited accountability and 
review. It is antithetical to the fair, public, and effective legal system that all 
Americans expect and deserve.”). 
 39. See id. 
 40. Id. 
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interests.41 In other words, allowing corporations to circumvent 
domestic courts and sue host-state governments to seek relief 
from taxpayers in ISDS tribunals compromise government 
sovereignty. An investor’s suit against a host government’s 
public welfare policy concerning the environment or public 
health thus interferes with a government’s regulatory 
autonomy. With that in mind, critics have suggested that ISDS 
allows investors to challenge public interest regulation thereby 
creating substantial risk of undermining State sovereignty.42 
In summary, arguments regarding ISDS have become 
increasingly politicized where competing interests of thought 
and different actors contribute to shape its institutional design 
and role. On a horizontal dimension, interest groups have 
debated the benefits and costs of arbitration, whereas on a 
vertical dimension governments encounter a challenge to 
balance national sovereignty against global or investor 
interests.43 
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Investor-state disputes have increased dramatically over 
the past two decades. The growth in international investment 
agreements has brought a major expansion in the filing of 
claims.44 In an Issue Note published on July 15, 2015, the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) 
found that in 2014 claimants initiated 42 known treaty-based 
ISDS cases.45 The total number of known ISDS cases reached 
608.”46 The following graph illustrates the overall known ISDS 
claims from 1987 to 2014 and includes arbitration proceedings 
 
 41. See Alex Weaver, Between ICSID and a Hard Place, 22 COLUM. J. EUR. 
L. (Apr. 10, 2015), http://cjel.law.columbia.edu/preliminary-reference/2015
/between-icsid-and-a-hard-place/ (“The opposition to ISDS is grounded in a 
legitimate concern over sovereignty and regulatory latitude.”). 
 42. See Claire Provost & Matt Kennard, The Obscure Legal System That 
Lets Corporations Sue Countries, GUARDIAN (June 10, 2015), http://www.the
guardian.com/business/2015/jun/10/obscure-legal-system-lets-corportations-
sue-states-ttip-icsid. 
 43. See Thomas Dietz & Marius Dotzauer, Political Dimensions of 
Investment Arbitration: ISDS and the TTIP Negotiations 19–20 (ZenTra Ctr. for 
Transnational Studies, Working Paper No. 48/2015). 
 44. Karton, supra note 7, at 1–2. 
 45. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., supra note 2, at 1. 
 46. Id. 
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arising from International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (“ICSID”) and non-ICSID disputes. 
 
Figure 1. The overall number of known ISDS claims is 608. 
Ninety-nine governments around the world have been 
respondents to one or more known ISDS claims.47 
 
 
 47. Id. at 2. 
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In the recent Issue Note, the UNCTAD also presented the 
types of claims that were subject to dispute proceedings. Some 
include claims arising from legislative reforms in the renewable 
energy sector, alleged discrimination of foreign investors, 
alleged direct expropriations of investments, and cases 
concerning public policies, including environmental issues, anti-
money laundering, and taxation.48 Furthermore, for the reported 
cases, the amount claimed ranges from $8 million to about $2.5 
billion.49 
On June 25, 2015, the UNCTAD, published the 2015 World 
Investment Report.50 For each year, the Report covers the latest 
trends in foreign direct investment and analyzes in-depth one 
selected topic related to foreign direct investment and 
development.51 The 2015 Report “aims to inform global debates 
on the future of the international policy environment for cross-
border investment.”52 In particular, it addresses the key 
challenges in international investment protection and 
promotion, including the right to regulate, investor-state dispute 
settlement, and investor responsibility.53 In Chapter 4, the 
Report addresses an action for IIA reform. It notes that, as a 
result of the increase in ISDS cases during the last fifteen years, 
broad IIA provisions have allowed investors to challenge core 
domestic policy decisions in the areas of environmental, energy, 
and health policies.54 Unlike the past, “there are more and more 
developed countries as defendants.”55 Consequently, it has 
triggered global debate about the pros and cons and whether or 
not to have ISDS. In response to these recent developments, “a 
number of countries have been reassessing their positions on 
ISDS and have already adopted certain reform measures.”56 
According to the Report, two broad alternatives have come to 
 
 48. See id. at 4. 
 49. Id. 
 50. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., World Investment Report 2015: 
Reforming International Investment Governance, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD
/WIR/2015 (June 25, 2015). 
 51. See generally World Investment Reports, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE 
AND DEV., http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report
/WIR-Series.aspx (last visited Oct. 5, 2016) (providing digital access to the 
World Investment Report, published annually since 1991). 
 52. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., supra note 50, at iii. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. at 125. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 145. 
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exist: to keep and reform ISDS, as some countries have done, or 
to abandon and/or replace ISDS. As the Report suggests, given 
the recent criticism of the existing system, “maintaining the 
status quo is hardly an option.”57 
IV. ANALYSIS 
With the recent growth in ISDS cases, countries have 
modified their approach in general trade policy and 
international investment treaties.58 In response to adverse 
outcomes in ISDS cases initiated by investors, an emerging 
trend in international trade policy from various countries has 
resulted in a shift towards safeguarding against ISDS abuses 
and further protecting host-state sovereignty.59 As a result of 
increased international attention on ISDS abuses, countries are 
thereby engaging in a more comprehensive approach toward 
protecting host state-sovereignty.60 Recent IIAs, bilateral 
investment treaties (“BIT”s), and ongoing trade negotiations 
among specific countries will thus illustrate an increased role in 
international investment law to protect a host state’s autonomy 
and mitigate potential ISDS abuses. 
A. INDIA: WHITE INDUSTRIES AUSTRALIA LIMITED V. 
REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON INDIA’S 
NEW MODEL BIT 
Recently, the Government of India approved a new Model 
BIT that will provide the terms and conditions for India’s future 
trade negotiations, including the renegotiations of some of its 83 
existing BITs and ongoing negotiations with the United States.61 
In general, the goal for structuring a BIT for a host state is to 
find an appropriate balance between two competing interests: 
providing investor protection and preserving a host state’s 
regulatory autonomy. India’s new Model BIT differs from the 
previous 2003 Model BIT, where the 2003 Model BIT functions 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Karton, supra note 7, at 1–2. 
 59. See FACT SHEET: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), supra 
note 9. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See India Approves Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, CMS LAW-NOW 
(Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.cms-lawnow.com/ealerts/2016/01/india-approves-
model-bilateral-investment-treaty. 
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as being more “investor-friendly.” Since 2010, notices and claims 
from various foreign investors under different BITs have 
increased, and as a result, it has influenced a shift towards more 
regulatory freedom.62 Subsequently, the new Model BIT shifts to 
being more “host-state friendly” by providing greater regulatory 
freedom and government protections. 
After 2010, India experienced a surge in its involvement 
with International Trade Administration (“ITA”) claims.63 In 
particular, a case in 2011 greatly influenced India’s 
reassessment on how to approach future bilateral investment 
treaties. In White Industries Australia Limited v. Republic of 
India, a tribunal found that India violated its obligations to the 
investor under the India-Australia BIT.64 The ruling was the 
first investment treaty decision adverse to India.65 White 
Industries, an Australian company, had been in contract to 
supply and develop equipment for Coal India.66 A dispute then 
arose between both parties and it was then submitted to the 
International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”).67 Nine years after 
the ICC awarded in favor of White Industries, the company was 
still waiting for domestic Indian Courts to decide upon its 
jurisdictional claims.68 White Industries then filed a claim 
against India under the Australia-India BIT and claimed that 
India violated its obligations because it had “treated White’s 
investment on a less favorable basis than treatment afforded to 
investments of investors of a third country.”69 Similar to the 
2003 Model BIT, the Australia-India BIT contains a broad 
definition of what constituted “investment” by a foreign 
investor.70 The Australia-India BIT does not contain language 
 
 62. See LAW COMM’N OF INDIA, REPORT NO. 260: ANALYSIS OF THE 2015 
DRAFT MODEL INDIAN BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY ¶ 1.6–7 (2015). 
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. India Approves Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, CMS LAW-NOW 
(Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.cms-lawnow.com/ealerts/2016/01/india-approves-
model-bilateral-investment-treaty. 
 66. White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, Final Award, ¶ 3.2.2, (ITA 
Inv. Treaty Cases 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0906.pdf. 
 67. Id. ¶ 3.2.24–29. 
 68. Id. ¶ 4.3.5. 
 69. Id. ¶ 4.4.1. 
 70. See Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 1, 
India-Austl., Feb. 26, 1999, http://finmin.nic.in/bipa/Australia.pdf; see also 
India Model Text of BIPA, ITALAW art. 1, http://www.italaw.com/sites
/default/files/archive/ita1026.pdf. 
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requiring an investor to have actual presence, nor a requirement 
of having business activities in the host state.71 The following 
text is what constitutes an “investment” under the Australia-
India BIT. 
(c) “investment” means every kind of asset, including 
intellectual property rights, invested by an investor of 
one Contracting Party in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party in accordance with the laws and 
investment policies of that Contracting Party . . . . 
(d) “investor” means: 
(i) in respect of India, a company or a national. A 
national is a person deriving status as an Indian 
national from the laws in force in India; 
(ii) in respect of Australia, a company or a natural 
person who is a citizen or permanent resident of 
Australia. A permanent resident is a natural whose 
residence in Australia is not limited as to time under 
its laws:72 
In addition, the Australia-India BIT contains a most favored 
nation (“MFN”) clause.73 A MFN clause allows an investor to 
import more beneficial standards of protection from other 
treaties. Subsequently, White Industries argued that the MFN 
clause allowed the company to import a more advantageous 
provision from the India-Kuwait BIT, which requires the host 
state to “provide effective means of asserting claims and 
enforcing rights.”74 The tribunal accepted the argument and 
awarded the company $4.08 million plus interest and fees.75 
 
 71. See Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, supra 
note 70; India Model Text of BIPA, supra note 70. 
 72. Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 1, 
India-Austl., Feb. 26, 1999, http://finmin.nic.in/bipa/Australia.pdf. 
 73. Id. art. 16 (“[W]hether general or specific, entitling investments by 
investors of the other Contracting Party to treatment more favorable than is 
provided for by the present agreement, such rules shall to the extent that they 
are more favorable prevail over the present Agreement.”). 
 74. Agreement for the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment, India-Kuwait, art. 4, Nov. 27, 2001, http://finmin.nic.in
/bipa/Kuwait.pdf. 
 75. White Indus, Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, supra note 66, ¶ 3.2.33. 
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Thus, the tribunal found that delays by India Courts amounted 
to a breach of the “effective means” standard under the India-
Kuwait BIT.76 
As a result of the decision in White Industries Australia 
Limited, India undertook a review of its 2003 Model BIT and 
made a new draft of a Model BIT.77 The new Model BIT shifts 
toward a more host-state friendly framework. The Law 
Commission of India’s Report on the first Model BIT draft states 
that “[t]he Report is presented with a view to assist the 
Government in achieving a balanced negotiating text, that takes 
into consideration the protection of Indian investors investing 
abroad, as well as safeguarding the regulatory powers of the 
State.”78 
Consequently, the new Model BIT eliminates the previous 
broad definition of what constitutes an “investment” and does 
not mention the application of an MFN clause.79 The new Model 
BIT adopts an “enterprise-based” approach to the definition of 
investment.80 The following text reflects what constitutes an 
“investment” under the new Model BIT released in January 
2016. 
”[I]nvestment” means an enterprise constituted, 
organised and operated in good faith by an investor in 
accordance with the law of the Party in whose territory 
the investment is made, taken together with the assets 
of the enterprise, has the characteristics of an 
investment such as the commitment of capital or other 
resources, certain duration, the expectation of gain or 
profit, the assumption of risk and a significance for the 
development of the Party in whose territory the 
 
 76. India Liable under BIT for Extensive Judicial Delays, THOMSON 
REUTERS, Feb. 29, 2012, at 2–3 (“[T]he court delays did not reach the high 
standard required to constitute a denial of justice, but they did breach the less 
demanding ‘effective means’ standard in the India-Kuwait BIT.”). 
 77. See LAW COMM’N OF INDIA, supra note 62, ¶ 1.7 (“As a result of the 
adverse White Industries award and the ITA notices under different BITs, there 
is renewed focus on India’s BIT programme.”). 
 78. Id. ¶ 1.12. 
 79. See Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, MINISTRY 
FIN., http://finmin.nic.in/the_ministry/dept_eco_affairs/investment_division
/ModelBIT_Annex.pdf. 
 80. See id. art. 1. 
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investment is made. An enterprise may possess the 
following assets . . . . 
“enterprise” means: 
(i) any legal entity constituted, organised and 
operated in compliance with the law of a Party, 
including any company, corporation, limited liability 
partnership or a joint venture; and 
(ii) a branch of any such entity established in the 
territory of a Party in accordance with its law and 
carrying out business activities there. 
“[I]nvestor” means a natural or juridical person of a 
Party, other than a branch or representative office, that 
has made an investment in the territory of the other 
Party; 
For the purposes of this definition, a “juridical person” 
means: 
(a) a legal entity that is constituted, organised and 
operated under the law of that Party and that has 
substantial business activities in the territory of that 
Party; or 
(b) a legal entity that is constituted, organised and 
operated under the laws of that Party and that is 
directly or indirectly owned or controlled by a natural 
person of that Party or by a legal entity mentioned 
under subclause (a) herein.81 
As a result, the new Model BIT defines an investment as “an 
enterprise constituted, organised and operated in good faith by 
an investor in accordance with the law of the Party in whose 
territory the investment is made . . . .”82 Enterprise includes “a 
branch of any such entity established in the territory of a Party 
in accordance with its law and carrying out business activities 
there.”83 In contrast, the Australia-India BIT described an 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. art. 1. 
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investment to include “every kind of asset.”84 Therefore, the 
definition of “investment” is more narrowly tailored than the 
Australia-India BIT, which is similar in language to India’s 2003 
Model BIT. Furthermore, the new Model BIT requires investors 
to exhaust local remedies at least 5 years before commencing a 
“notice of dispute” under an international tribunal.85 Also, the 
new Model BIT does not contain a MFN provision.86 In effect, 
unlike White Industries Australia Limited, the new Model BIT 
would prohibit treaty shopping and disallow investors to import 
beneficial provisions in other India BITs. 
The adverse outcome in White Industries Australia Limited 
and the recent increase in pending claims from investors have 
shifted India’s new Model BIT from a prior “investor-friendly” to 
a “host-state friendly” framework. Although India’s new Model 
BIT ensures investor protection, it tips the scale more toward 
protecting its sovereignty. As India emerges in the global 
marketplace towards a more open economy, the country’s new 
model BIT illustrates greater protections for governance. While 
India continues to integrate with the global economy and 
negotiate prospective investment trade treaties, the new Model 
BIT provides India with more autonomy and safeguards against 
prospective ISDS claims like in White Industries Australia Ltd. 
B. CANADA: LONE PINE RESOURCES INC. V. THE 
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON 
CETA 
In August 2014, Canada and the European Union concluded 
negotiations on the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (“CETA”).87 In Canada and the European 
Union, ISDS measures and recent cases have raised public 
scrutiny and doubts concerning FTAs.88 Questions in Germany 
 
 84. See Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, India-
Austl., Feb. 26, 1999, http://finmin.nic.in/bipa/Australia.pdf. 
 85. Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 79, 
art. 15. 
 86. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 87. See Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), EUROPEAN 
COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ (last updated Aug. 3, 
2016). 
 88. See Les Whittington, Investor Protection Fears Could Unravel Canada-
EU Trade Deal, TORONTO STAR (Jul. 26, 2014), http://www.thestar.com
/news/canada/2014/07/26/investor_protection_fears_could_unravel_canadaeu_t
rade_deal.html. 
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about the value of ISDS measures were heightened by a case 
involving a Swedish power company, Vattenfall, filing suit 
against Germany for $5.8 billion plus interest after Germany 
began to phase out nuclear energy.89 The final decision was not 
available to the public.90 Similarly, a case also raised doubt in 
Canada where an energy company, Lone Pine Resources Inc., 
initially filed a $250 million suit against Canada under 
provisions of NAFTA after Quebec implemented a ban on 
fracking.91 The case remains active. Subsequently, Canada and 
the European Union began to increase their attention to 
reassess ISDS as prospective trade negotiations between both 
countries continued. The consolidated text of the agreement 
reflects this commitment.92 In the preamble, the agreement 
states that “the provisions of this Agreement preserve the right 
of the Parties to regulate within their territories and the Parties’ 
flexibility to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as public 
health, safety, environment, public morals and the promotion 
and protection of cultural diversity.”93 As a result of increased 
public criticism and the Lone Pine Resources’ case, the final 
CETA negotiations signal an indication that Canada and the 
EU, have begun to consider reforming ISDS and to further 
protect state sovereignty. 
In Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. The Government of Canada, 
Lone Pine Resources alleges that the company has contractual 
interests relating to five exploration licenses for petroleum, 
 
 89. See generally NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER & MARTIN 
DIETRICH BRAUCH, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE STATE OF PLAY IN 
VATTENFALL V. GERMANY II: LEAVING THE GERMAN PUBLIC IN THE DARK 2 (Dec. 
2014), http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/state-of-play-
vattenfall-vs-germany-II-leaving-german-public-dark-en.pdf (“According to 
most recent media reports, Vattenfall is claiming compensation of 
€4,675,903,975.32 (US$5.8 billion) plus 4 per cent interest. . . . [T]he German 
government spent over €3.2 million on attorneys’ fees, experts’ fees and services 
such as translations; that amount also includes €200,000 spent on arbitration 
costs. Machnig also stated that the German government estimates that the total 
costs of the proceedings could reach €9 million.”). 
 90. See Vattenfall AB v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/12/12, Decision, (ITA Inv. Treaty Cases 2013), http://www.italaw.com
/cases/1654#sthash.gUAhqAcV.dpuf. 
 91. Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. Government of Canada, Notice of 
Arbitration, ¶¶ 53–58 (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default
/files/case-documents/italaw1596.pdf. 
 92. See Consolidated CETA Text, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://trade.ec.
europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 
2016). 
 93. Id. at 3. 
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natural gas, and underground reservoirs.94 The licenses were 
signed with the holder, Junex Inc., a Canadian company.95 In 
2011, a Quebec law, An Act to limit oil and gas activities (the 
“Act”), was enacted to revoke exploration licenses located in the 
St. Lawrence River, and consequently, the Act revoked one of 
Lone Pine Resources’ exploration licenses.96 Lone Pine claimed 
that the revocation of the license violated Canada’s obligations 
under Article 1105 of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (“NAFTA”).97 Article 1105 of NAFTA provides that 
“each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another 
Party treatment in accordance with international law, including 
fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”98 
In addition, Lone Pine claimed the revocation of the license 
violated Canada’s obligations under Article 1110 of NAFTA.99 
Article 1110 states: “No Party may directly or indirectly 
nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of 
another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to 
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment, except: 
for a public purpose; on a non-discriminatory basis; in 
accordance with due process of law, and on payment of 
compensation.”100 Lone Pine therefore asserts that the Act 
breaches NAFTA in two ways: (1) that the revocation constituted 
an uncompensated “expropriation” that lacks a public purpose 
in violation of Article 110; and (2) the Act violates Canada’s 
obligation to afford the “minimum standard” guaranteed by 
Article 1105 to Lone Pine’s investments. 
In response, the Government of Canada alleged that the Act 
does not affect the claimant because it is not the holder of the 
exploration license owned by Junex.101 The Government notes 
 
 94. See Cases Filed Against the Government of Canada: Lone Pine 
Resources Inc. v. Government of Canada, GLOBAL AFF. CAN., 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-
domaines/disp-diff/lone.aspx?lang=eng (last modified Mar. 22, 2016) 
[hereinafter GLOBAL AFF. CAN.]. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. The Government of Canada, Claimant’s 
Memorial, ¶ 6 (ITA Inv. Treaty Cases 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites
/default/files/case-documents/italaw4259.pdf [hereinafter Lone Pine 
Resources]. 
 97. See id. ¶ 280. 
 98. See id.; see also North American Free Trade AgreementCan-Mex.-U.S., 
art. 1105, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289. 
 99. Lone Pine Resources, supra note 96, ¶ 7. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See GLOBAL AFF. CAN., supra note 94. 
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that the Act is a legitimate measure of public interest that 
applies indiscriminately to all holders of exploration licenses, 
and achieves an important public policy objective—the 
protection of the St. Lawrence River.102 The Act therefore cannot 
be considered an “arbitrary, unfair or inequitable measure.”103 
Lastly, the Government of Canada disputes the investment was 
capable of being expropriated, and even if so, the Act was not 
“tantamount” to expropriation or substantially depriving the 
investor because only one of the five licenses was revoked.104 
Ultimately, the Government suggests that the Act is a 
“legitimate exercise of the Government of Quebec’s police power 
and, thus, the measure cannot constitute an expropriation.”105 
The status of the case remains active. As Canadian taxpayers 
remain subject to liability for millions of dollars, the case has 
long raised public scrutiny in Canada.106 Consequently, an 
adverse decision holding Canada in violation of the agreement 
could further ignite public tensions on the country’s trade 
policies moving forward. 
Furthermore, Canada is the most sued country under 
NAFTA and a majority of the disputes involve investors 
challenging the country’s environmental laws.107 As a result of 
numerous ISDS claims against Canada, including Lone Pine 
Resources Inc., a growing backlash has resulted in Canada and 
globally against ISDS claims challenging public policy and 
regulatory measures.108 With that in mind, the prospective trade 
agreement between Canada and the European Commission 
(“CETA”) can provide an indication on whether Canada has 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See generally Julian Beltrame, Quebec Fracking Ban Lawsuit Shows 
Perils Of Free Trade Deals: Critics, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 10, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/10/03/quebec-fracking-ban-
lawsuit_n_4038173.html (warning that Canada needs to be careful in 
negotiating trade pacts around the world). 
 107. Sunny Freeman, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 Makes Canada Most-Sued 
Country Under Free Trade Tribunals, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 14, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/01/14/canada-sued-investor-state-dispute-
ccpa_n_6471460.html. 
 108. See Scott Sinclair, Investor vs. State: Canada is Being Pummeled by 
NAFTA Corporate Lawsuits. Why Do We Put Up with It?, CANADIAN CTR. FOR 
POL’Y ALTERNATIVES (July 1, 2015), https://www.policyalternatives.ca
/publications/monitor/investor-vs-state. 
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altered its terms on ISDS and shifted more towards protecting a 
host state’s regulatory freedom. 
On September 26, 2014, the Canada-EU summit marked the 
end of the negotiations of CETA.109 The trade-negotiating 
mandate became available to the public in December 2015.110 
The Preamble of CETA recognizes that the provisions preserve 
the right to regulate and preserve a host state’s flexibility to 
achieve legitimate policy objectives.111 In addition, the preamble 
also ensures recognition of the “importance of international 
security, democracy, human rights and the rule of law for the 
development of international trade and economic 
cooperation.”112 Therefore, while CETA ensures investor 
protection, the general purpose of CETA also highlights the 
significance of protecting state sovereignty. Under NAFTA, as 
noted in Lone Pine Resources Inc., the agreement contains a 
broad public interest exception under what constitutes an 
expropriation. However, under CETA, the language goes further 
to address a host state’s right to regulate: 
For greater certainty, except in the rare circumstance 
where the impact of the measure or series of measures is 
so severe in light of its purpose that it appears manifestly 
excessive, non-discriminatory measures of a Party that 
are designed and applied to protect legitimate public 
welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the 
environment, do not constitute indirect 
expropriations.113  
The language differs from NAFTA’s expropriation clause 
and further expands protection for a host state’s regulatory 
autonomy. As illustrated in the text, CETA thus provides “a 
presumption that there is no indirect expropriation where a new 
regulation in the field of health, safety and environment makes 
it substantially more costly for companies to deploy their 
activities in the host State concerned.”114 
 
 109. See Canada, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy
/countries-and-regions/countries/canada/ (last modified Sept. 13, 2016). 
 110. See id. 
 111. Consolidated CETA Text, supra note 92. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 183. 
 114. EU Law Alert: Increased Protection of Foreign Investments Under the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Recently Signed Between the 
European Union and Canada, KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS & FRANKEL LLP (Oct. 
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In addition, the ISDS provisions in CETA stipulate new 
rules on the conduct of procedures in ISDS proceedings. 
Specifically, these include “complete transparency—all 
documents submitted will be publicly available, all hearings will 
be open to the public and all interested parties will be able to 
make submissions.”115 The improved transparency is intended to 
replace previous BIT agreements between Canada and the 
European Commission, which had given rise to serious concerns 
as to “both transparency and abusive or excessive restrictions on 
public authorities in their relations with foreign investors.”116 As 
a result of much criticism of the confidential arbitral 
proceedings, Article 8.36 of the consolidated text ensures 
transparency of proceedings by adopting the UNCITRAL Rules 
on Transparency to all ISDS proceedings.117 
With initiatives also pushed by the European Commission, 
the recent conclusions of negotiations under CETA illustrate 
Canada’s commitment to reform ISDS and further protect host-
state regulatory autonomy.118 The rise of public dissatisfaction 
may not completely reflect the changes made in ISDS under 
CETA. Nevertheless, it does provide a greater emphasis than 
previous IIAs on ensuring host state sovereignty. 
C. AUSTRALIA: PHILIP MORRIS ASIA LIMITED V. THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA AND RESULTING 
CHANGES UNDER CHAFTA 
On June 17, 2015, China and Australia signed the China-
Australia Free Trade Agreement (“ChAFTA”), which was 
implemented on December 20, 2015.119 Prior to the enactment, 
 
27, 2014), http://www.kramerlevin.com/EU-Law-Alert-Increased-Protection-of-
Foreign-Investments-Under-the-Comprehensive-Economic-and-Trade-
Agreement-Recently-Signed-Between-the-European-Union-and-Canada-10-27-
2014/. 
 115. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, CETA – SUMMARY OF THE FINAL NEGOTIATING 
RESULTS 11 (2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/december/
tradoc_152982.pdf; see generally UNCITRAL, RULES ON TRANSPARENCY IN 
TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION (Jan. 2014), https://www.
uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-
Transparency-E.pdf (explaining rule on transparency). 
 116. EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 115, at 12. 
 117. See Consolidated CETA Text, supra note 92, at 66. 
 118. See Investment Provisions in the EU-Canada Free Trade Agreement 
(CETA), EUROPEAN COMM’N (Feb. 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs
/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdf. 
 119. See China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA), AUSTRALIAN 
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in 2011, tobacco company Phillip Morris filed suit against 
Australia alleging the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (the 
“Tobacco Act”) prohibited the company from using its 
intellectual property on tobacco products and packaging.120 The 
Tobacco Act regulates the retail packaging and appearance of 
tobacco products.121 Its stated objectives include, “the 
improvement of public health by discouraging people from 
taking up smoking, encouraging people to give up smoking, 
discouraging people from relapsing if they have given it up, and 
reducing people’s exposure to smoke from tobacco products to 
improve public health by discouraging people from smoking.”122 
The company claimed that the Tobacco Act violated a trade 
agreement between Australia and Hong Kong. 
The suit resulted in international public criticism and 
dissent from the ISDS mechanism in FTAs.123 Robert French, 
Chief Justice of Australia’s Highest Court, subsequently gave a 
speech reflecting the public dissatisfaction of ISDS proceedings 
by highlighting the significance of the Philip Morris dispute and 
the risks posed by ISDS.124 The recent approval of ChAFTA on 
June 17, 2015, even though ISDS proceedings are included in 
agreement, can provide an indication of ISDS changes and 
whether more protection for a host state’s regulatory autonomy 
exists. 
In Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, Philip Morris, a 
United States company that holds a Hong Kong-based 
subsidiary, claimed that the Tobacco Act violated provisions in 
the Australia-Hong Kong BIT.125 Philip Morris alleged that the 
Tobacco Act violated the commitment to “fair and equitable 
 
TRADE AND INV. COMM’N, https://www.austrade.gov.au/Australian/Export/Free-
Trade-Agreements/chafta (last visited Oct. 1, 2016). 
 120. See Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, Notice of Claim, ¶ 10, (ITA Inv. 
Treaty Cases 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/ita0664.pdf [hereinafter Philip Morris Claim]. 
 121. See JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43 (Austl.). 
 122. Id. 
 123. See e.g., Danielle Mackey, The US-EU Trade Treaty That Could Let 
Corporations Sue Governments, ALJAZEERA AM. (May 27, 2015), 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/5/27/a-eu-us-trade-agreement-could-
allow.html (“[T]he Philip Morris case exemplifies some of the driving factors for 
the public outcry over the system . . . .”). 
 124. Chief Justice Robert French, Investor-State Dispute Settlement—A 
Cut Above the Courts?, Speech at the Supreme and Federal Courts Judges’ 
Conference 4–6 (July 9, 2014), http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications
/speeches/current-justices/frenchcj/frenchcj09jul14.pdf. 
 125. See Philip Morris Claim, supra note 120, ¶ 10 (b). 
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treatment” of the company’s investments under Article 2(2).126 
In addition, the company argued that the Tobacco Act 
constituted a direct and indirect expropriation of investments 
without adequate compensation, thereby violating Article 6 of 
the Hong Kong-Australia BIT.127 The following text illustrates 
the language governing expropriation in Article 6: 
Investors of either Contracting Party shall not be 
deprived of their investments nor subjected to measures 
having effect equivalent to such deprivation in the area 
of the other Contracting Party except under due process 
of law, for a public purpose related to the internal needs 
of that Party, on a non-discriminatory basis, and against 
compensation.128 
The Government of Australia responded by arguing that the 
plain packaging measures are non-discriminatory regulatory 
measures to achieve a public welfare objective: the protection of 
public health.129 The government asserted that such measures 
do not amount to expropriation and a duty of compensation.130 
Furthermore, the government argued that the measure did not 
constitute unfair or inequitable treatment because the measure 
was not arbitrary.131 Rather, the Tobacco Act was based on a 
“broad range of studies and reports on which the Australian 
Government has relied in good faith, and is supported by leading 
Australian and international public health experts” and was 
“adopted following a transparent process.”132 Essentially, the 
government alleges to have responded in good faith with a 
“reasonable regulatory response” to address public health 
concerns.133 After a lengthy process, the tribunal eventually 
dismissed the suit, ruling in favor of the Government of 
Australia. However, Australians incurred more than fifty 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. ¶ 10 (a). 
 128. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austl.-
H.K., Sept. 15, 1993, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/Treaty
File/152. 
 129. See Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, Case No. 2012-12, Australia’s 
Response to the Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 38 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2011), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0666.pdf. 
 130. Id. ¶ 46. 
 131. Id. ¶ 47. 
 132. Id. ¶ 49. 
 133. See id. 
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million dollars of taxpayers’ money arising from legal costs to 
defend against the complaint.134 
While increased public criticism against ISDS clauses 
resulted from the Philip Morris suit, Australia signed a bilateral 
trade agreement with China.135 The agreement makes several 
changes in ISDS proceedings and attempts to further protect a 
host state country’s right to regulate for legitimate public 
welfare objectives. First, the preamble of the agreement notes 
the recognition of safeguarding public welfare. “Upholding the 
rights of their governments to regulate in order to meet national 
policy objectives, and to preserve their flexibility to safeguard 
public welfare.”136 
Secondly, under Article 9.11, the text includes a public 
welfare objective provision: “Measures of a Party that are non-
discriminatory and for the legitimate public welfare objectives of 
public health, safety, the environment, public morals or public 
order shall not be the subject of a claim under this Section.”137 
Furthermore, under Article 9.17, the agreement makes 
certain changes to ISDS settlement proceedings by increasing 
transparency throughout the arbitration process and 
proceedings.138 Lastly, Article 9.8 further addresses regulatory 
autonomy for a host state. The Article ensures that both states 
are entitled to enact measures if it is: 
(a) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health; (b) necessary to ensure compliance with laws and 
regulations that are not inconsistent with this 
Agreement; (c) imposed for the protection of national 
treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value; or 
(d) relating to the conservation of living or non-living 
exhaustible natural resources.139  
 
 134. Lori Wallach, Public Interest Takes a Hit Even When Phillip Morris’ 
Investor-State Attack on Australia Is Dismissed, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 5, 
2016, 2:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lori-wallach/public-interest-
takes-a-h_b_8918010.html. 
 135. See Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-China, June 17, 2015, 
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/chafta/official-documents/Pages/official-
documents.aspx. 
 136. Id. at pmbl. 
 137. Id. art. 9.11(4). 
 138. See id. art. 9.17. 
 139. Id. art. 9.8(1). 
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Thus, the increase in public criticism arising from the Philip 
Morris suit has resulted in certain adjustments in Australia’s 
trade policy that correspond to greater transparency of 
arbitration proceedings and further protection of host-state 
sovereignty. 
D. AUSTRALIA, BRUNEI, CANADA, CHILE, JAPAN, MALAYSIA, 
MEXICO, NEW ZEALAND, PERU, SINGAPORE, U.S., 
VIETNAM: PUBLIC SCRUTINY CONCERNING ISDS AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS ON THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
(TPP) 
On February 4, 2016, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, one of 
the world’s largest multinational trade deals, was signed by 
twelve member nations in New Zealand.140 The agreement is not 
currently in force, though the signing represents “an important 
step” toward implementation.141 Throughout the negotiation 
process in the United States and other member nations the 
prospective deal has received increased scrutiny among citizens 
and policymakers. After intense scrutiny concerning a lack of 
transparency, the text was publicly released on November 5, 
2015.142 As a result of the recent signing, Congressional approval 
is subsequently required for the agreement to enter into force in 
the United States.143 During a Senate floor debate, Senator 
Elizabeth Warren expressed her concerns on the signing of the 
agreement in the following statement: 
I urge my colleagues to reject the T.P.P. and stop an 
agreement that would tilt the playing field even more in 
favor of big multinational corporations and against 
working families . . . . Evidence of this tilt can be seen in 
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a key T.P.P. provision, investor state dispute resolution, 
ISDS. With ISDS, big companies get the right to 
challenge laws they don’t like—not in courts but if [sic] 
front of industry friendly arbitration panels that sit 
outside any court system. Those panels can force 
taxpayers to write huge checks to big corporations with 
no appeals.144 
As illustrated, Senator Warren specifically criticized ISDS 
and its potential adverse implications on a host state’s taxpayers 
when claims are initiated in “industry-friendly” arbitration 
panels.145 With many other stakeholders sharing Senator 
Warren’s consistent concerns on the TPP, negotiations have not 
completely rejected these considerations. Criticism concerning 
ISDS remained throughout the negotiating process. Even 
though ISDS is still incorporated in the negotiated agreement, 
the agreement includes some changes regarding its 
application.146 
First, with respect to regulatory autonomy and host-state 
sovereignty, the agreement provides each country the ability to 
regulate in the public interest. Under most contemporary trade 
agreements, investors are protected against expropriation. In 
the TPP, an expropriation is present when a Party “interferes 
with a tangible or intangible property right or property interest 
in an investment.”147 A direct expropriation occurs when an 
investment is nationalized or “otherwise directly expropriated 
through formal transfer of title or outright seizure.”148 An 
indirect expropriation occurs when “an action or series of actions 
by a Party has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation 
without formal transfer of title or outright seizure.”149 The 
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determination of an indirect expropriation requires a case-by-
case inquiry considering several factors.150 However, the text 
does provide protection for a host-state country’s public policy 
objectives. The agreement reserves the right for each country to 
regulate in the public interest. In particular, the following 
language in the agreement counteracts complete investor 
protection and the application of indirect expropriation: “[n]on-
discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed 
and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such 
as public health, safety and the environment, do not constitute 
indirect expropriations, except in rare circumstances.”151 
As shown in the above language, like CETA, the provision 
does not classify a host-state government’s public welfare 
policies as an “indirect expropriation” except in “rare 
circumstances.”152 Thus, the language creates a presumption of 
legitimacy, in favor of host-state government’s policies and 
regulations. 
There are additional safeguards incorporated in the 
agreement concerning ISDS. In the Chapter Summary on 
Investment, the United States Trade Representative states that 
the chapter ensures American investors protection, “while 
reforming the investor-state dispute settlement [ ] system by 
providing for tools to dismiss frivolous claims and instituting a 
range of other procedural and substantive safeguards.”153 In 
particular, some procedural safeguards include prevention of an 
investor pursuing the same claim in parallel proceedings, 
amicus curiae submissions, and dismissal of frivolous claims.154 
Furthermore, under arbitration proceedings, the agreement also 
imposes investors the “burden of proving all elements of its 
claims.”155 Under the Chapter on Dispute Settlement, the 
agreement provides some improvements on the ISDS 
mechanism. Unlike the United States Model BIT, a binding code 
of conduct for arbitrators does exist. In the Model BIT, there is 
no explicit provision where an arbitrator is required to disclose 
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any conflict of interest. In contrast, TPP countries will establish 
a code of conduct for all panelists of a proceeding.156 
Regarding transparency, the agreement contains a specific 
chapter on “Transparency & Anti-Corruption.”157 According to 
the United States Trade Representative, the chapter requires 
TPP parties to ensure that “their laws, regulations, and 
administrative rulings related to any matters covered by the 
TPP Agreement are publicly available and that regulations are 
subject to notice and comment.”158 The public in each TPP 
country will thus be able to follow proceedings.159 Thus, even 
though the TPP does not contain a specific appeals mechanism 
for arbitration proceedings as advocated by Senator Warren and 
others, the agreement signals an improvement on transparency 
to further safeguard against ISDS abuses. 
Lastly, as illustrated in Philip Morris, the Australian plain 
packaging law had previously inspired criticism against the TPP 
for possibly allowing the deal to embed greater protection for the 
tobacco industry. Since 2013, many argued that the TPP would 
continue to provide a favorable position for the tobacco industry 
against host-countries and respective plain packaging laws.160 
Nevertheless, the growing criticism and public backlash have 
resulted in a loss for tobacco companies when the final TPP 
agreement contained language disallowing ISDS protection to 
 
 156. Compare The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Chapter 28–Dispute 
Settlement, MEDIUM BLOG OFFICE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Nov 5, 2015), 
https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-partnership/dispute-settlement-
a5b4569a9a55#.sy0i2fakn [hereinafter TPP Ch. 28], with 2012 U.S. Model 
Bilateral Investment Treaty, BILATERALS (2012), http://www.bilaterals.org
/IMG/pdf/BIT_text_for_ACIEP_Meeting.pdf. 
 157. See The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Chapter 26–Transparency & Anti-
Corruption, MEDIUM BLOG OFFICE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Nov 5, 2015), 
https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-partnership/transparency-and-anti-
corruption-3d808cf86184#.gtn27zv3b [hereinafter TPP Ch. 26]. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Summary 
of the Trans-Pac. P’ship Agreement, at ¶ 28, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/press-releases/2015/october/summary-trans-pacific-
partnership (“The public in each TPP Party will be able to follow proceedings, 
since submissions made in disputes will be made available to the public, 
hearings will be open to the public unless the disputing Parties otherwise agree, 
and the final report presented by panels will also be made available to the 
public.”). 
 160. See generally Jane Kelsey, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: A 
Gold-Plated Gift to the Global Tobacco Industry?, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 237–64 
(2013) (explaining that some of proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
rules, if accepted, could bring about favorable change to the U.S. tobacco 
industry by removing tariff barriers and regulatory restrictions). 
2017] EMERGING TREND IN INT’L TRADE  301 
apply to tobacco industries.161 In particular, under Article 29.5 
of the agreement, a host-state government can elect to deny the 
ability of a tobacco company to challenge a government’s 
“tobacco control measure.”162 The text explicitly states: 
A Party may elect to deny the benefits of Section B of 
Chapter 9 (Investment) with respect to claims 
challenging a tobacco control measure of the Party 
. . . .For greater certainty, if a Party elects to deny 
benefits with respect to such claims, any such claim shall 
be dismissed.163 
In the Chapter Summary, the United States Trade 
Representative explained that the provision reflects “the ability 
to regulate manufactured tobacco products and protect public 
health.”164 For the first time in any trade agreement, each TPP 
country is given the right to decide whether investors under 
ISDS can challenge its tobacco control measures.165 In effect, 
prior criticism on the tobacco industry and the Australian plain 
packaging law dispute has resulted in considerable changes in 
the TPP to safeguard against ISDS abuse from tobacco 
companies. 
In sum, although Senator Warren’s criticism has not 
resulted in a complete abandonment of the ISDS mechanism or 
establishment of an appeals court, the TPP presents some 
improvements. Keep in mind, the TPP is a large multilateral 
agreement consisting of major countries including the United 
States, Canada, Japan, and Australia. Specifically, the 
agreement includes economies that represent nearly forty 
percent of global GDP.166 Although the agreement is not 
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currently in force and prospects of implementation remain 
uncertain, it provides an illustration of how major countries are 
reassessing and rethinking their approach to ISDS. As a result, 
while the ISDS mechanism remains as a protection for investors 
in the TPP, substantive and procedural changes illustrate a shift 
to further safeguard against abuses and protect host-state 
sovereignty. 
V. CONCLUSION: TRADE POLICY AMONG COUNTRIES 
ARE SHIFTING TOWARDS SAFEGUARDING 
AGAINST ISDS ABUSES AND PROTECTING 
HOST-STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
As the number of ISDS claims has increased throughout the 
years, public criticism has been shared internationally in light 
of investors filing suits against host nations. In particular, 
investor suits challenging a host nation’s ability to adopt public 
policy have largely received public scrutiny. In a more 
interconnected and open global marketplace, liberalizing rules 
to attract more trade and investment can impact a host-state’s 
ability to effectuate policy objectives concerning public health, 
safety, and the environment. 
In response to growing public dissent concerning ISDS 
proceedings and the exposure of suits compromising domestic 
policy, many countries have reassessed their policies in 
international trade treaties. As recent global trade policies and 
agreements suggest, changes to ISDS signal an emerging shift 
towards further safeguards against ISDS abuses and greater 
protections for host state sovereignty. India’s new Model BIT, 
CAFTA, ChAFTA, and the TPP reflect a change to reform the 
ISDS mechanism and incorporate more substantive provisions 
that further protect a host state’s regulatory autonomy. Moving 
forward, as countries rethink trade policy and enter into 
prospective trade agreements, substantive changes can provide 
further insight on the rules governing trade in the 21st century. 
